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THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES-AN END TO
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
It may be safely stated as a general principle that it is not
within the province of any court to control or review the de-
terminations of the political branch that are within the limits
of the constitution.1 Although this line between judicial and
legislative functions in government has not been drawn with
precision, for many years the judiciary has refrained from in-
terference in those fields which it considers purely political in
nature.
The courts have long felt that each department should be
limited to a sphere of activity for which it is best fitted ;2 and
consequently they have denied jurisdiction over the subject
matter or declared non-justiciables questions in such fields as
foreign relations,4 validity of enactments,5 the status of Indian
tribes,6 and legislative apportionment. 7 In 1840 the English jus-
tices refused to intervene in The Duke of York's Claim to the
Crown.8 In 1844 the famous Dorr's rebellion broke out in Rhode
Island, and Dorr was elected governor under a government or-
ganized by a popular assembly without regard to the existing
charter government. Our Supreme Court, called upon to de-
termine the duly constituted government, refused to undertake
jurisdiction, holding that the question was one which Congress
alone must decide.9 Then, as late as 1946, the Court refused to
exercise its equity powers over a claim challenging the con-
stitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts in
the state of Illinois.
10
These decisions have been predicated on the belief that such
controversies ought to be determined by the people in their
sovereign capacity or that full discretionary powers should be
left to the legislative or executive departments." The doctrine
that has evolved from these cases has come to be known as the
1. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907).
2. Finkelstein, Judicial Self Limitation, 37 HARV. L. RLrV. 338, 363 (1924).
3. If the duty asserted may not be judicially identified and its breach judicial-
ly determined or if protection for the right cannot be judicially molded, then
the claim is non-justiciable. Justice Brennan for the majority in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
4. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
5. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
6. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
7. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
8. 5 Rot. Parl. 375, WAMBAUGH, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1 (1460).
9. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
10. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
11. In Re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
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doctrine of "political questions"-a prime example of judicial
self restraint. However the scope of its jurisdiction is a question
the Court itself must decide12-a fact unquestionably demon-
strated by the radical change in the Court's treatment of legis-
lative reapportionment reflected in the cases which follow.13
COLGROE v. GREEN
In 1946 a suit was brought under the Federal Declaratory
Judgements Act challenging the apportionment of congressional
districts in Illinois as unconstitutional. The district court dis-
missed the action for want of equity, stating that the issue was
of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not within the
province of the courts to decide.' 4 The Supreme Court in a four
to three decision (Justice Rutledge concurring) affirmed the
decision of the lower court,13 finding the "issue to be of a pe-
culiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination."'-6 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority
cited article I, section 4 of the Constitution providing that the
manner of electing representatives "shall be prescribed in each
state by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such regulations . . ." [Emphasis
added]. The majority felt that the short article I, section 4 was
that the Constitution had conferred on Congress the exclusive
authority to secure fair representation in the states, and further-
more, that it would be unwise for the courts "to enter this po-
litical thicket."17
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, dis-
senting, felt that the complaint presented a justiciable cause and
controversy and that the court should exercise jurisdiction.' 8
He argued that existing malapportionment amounted to a will-
ful discrimination against urban voters and a denial of equal
protection of the laws. Black was of the opinion that the mal-
apportionment of the congressional districts destroyed the ef-
fectiveness of the plaintiffs' vote, and that such dilution was no
12. Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. REv. 296, 302 (1925).
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963) ; Westberry v. Sanders, 84 Sup. Ct. 526 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 84
Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964).
14. Colgrove v. Green, 64 F. Supp. 632 (1946).
15. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
16. Id. at 552.
17. Id. at 556.
18. Id. at 557, Black dissenting.
1964]
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more constitutionally permissible than denying their vote al-
together.
Justice Rutledge concurred in the affirmance, contending that
the "cure sought may be worse than the disease," 19 and con-
sequently that the case should be dismissed for want of equity.
Though he agreed with the dissent that the "Court has power
to afford relief in a case of this type as against the objection
that the issues are not justiciable,"20 there are "important points
of concurrence" with the reasoning of the majority.21 Thus it
was questionable for some sixteen years whether Colgrove "flatly
held that there was jurisdiction over the subject matter,"22 or
merely denied jurisdiction as a matter of equitable restraint,
"though not in the strict sense of want of power." 23  Those
per curiam decisions on similar cases after Colgrove did little to
answer the question.
24
Some indication of a possible change of position was apparent
from the Court's decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.
25
Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other
state power, lies in the scope of relevant limitations imposed
by the United States Constitution. [emphasis added].
26
In declaring unconstitutional the redefining of the municipal
limits of Tuskeegee, Alabama, the Court held that the systematic
exclusion of Negroes was an abridgement of their rights under
the fifteenth amendment.2 7 Colgrove was distinguished as in-
volving merely legislative inaction and the resulting dilution of
voting power, whereas Gomillion involved an affirmative action
depriving a readily isolated racial minority of their votes and
the consequent advantages of the ballot.
BAKER v. CARR
In 1962 an action was brought challenging the constitution-
ality of Tennessee's 1901 apportionment statute on the grounds
that it denied the plaintiffs and those similarly situate equal
19. Id. at 566, Rutledge concurring.
20. Id. at 565, Rutledge concurring.
21. Baker v. Carr, 369 U S. 186, 277 (1962), Frankfurter dissenting.
22. Id. at 202, Brennan for the majority.
23. Id. at 277, Frankfurter dissenting.
24. For an enumeration of Colgrove's spawn, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 202-203.
25. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
26. Id. at 344-345.
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protection under the laws. A three judge district court, relying
on Colgrove, dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that no claim was
stated upon which relief could be granted.
2 8
On appeal the Supreme Court in six separate opinions (three
concurring and two dissenting) reversed the lower court and
remanded the case for trial on the merits.29 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority (with whom Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Black concurred), held only (a) that the court possessed
jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that the claim stated a
justiciable30 cause of action; and (c) that the appellants had
standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes.
The court disposed of Colgrove by stating that the district court
misconceived the holding of the case as authority for lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The holding was precisely to the contrary of their reading
of it. Seven members of the Court participated in the de-
cision.... Two of the opinions expressing the views of four
of the Justices, a majority, flatly held that there was juris-
diction of the subject matter.31
The majority then restricted the "political questions" aspect of
Colgrove to those cases involving separation of powers between
co-ordinate branches of the federal government, and those claims
arising under the "guaranty clause" of article 4, section 4.
8
2
Having thus restricted Colgrove, the court was faced with
two major questions: (1) were there sufficient "judicially man-
ageable and discoverable principles"'33 to resolve the issue and
(2) would the consequences be so tremendous as to dictate ju-
dicial restraint? The Court disposed of the first question simply
by declaring that "judicial standards under the Equal Protection
Clause are well developed and familiar.134 Turning then to
possible consequences, Justice Brennan observed that "we risk
[no] embarrasment of our government abroad, or grave disturb-
ance at home if we take issue with Tennessee as to the consti-
28. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (1962).
29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
30. Justice Brennan defined justiciability as the ability to identify the duty
asserted and to determine its breach and the ability judicially to mold pro-
tection for the asserted right. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
31. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 202 (1962).
32. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . ."
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tutionality of her action here challenged."3 5 Consequently, in
the words of the Court, the fourteenth amendment was held to
prohibit state action that reflected "no policy, but simply arbi-
trary and capricious action."
36
Justice Douglas and Clark, in separate concurring opinions,
would have had the Court in Baker go beyond the mere declara-
tion of jurisdiction to a determination of substantive law. Both
construed the fourteenth amendment as prohibiting "invidious
discrimination," and Justice Clark interpreted the majority as
holding, "at least sub silentio," that invidious discrimination was
present.31 Justice Clark then concluded by stating that, in his
opinion, "the ultimate decision today is in the greatest tradition
of this Court" [emphasis added], 88 a statement that led many
to wonder just what the ultimate decision of Baker really was.
Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justice Harlan concurred,
dissenting, was of the opinion that the appellants were asking
the Court to choose among competing theories of political phi-
losophy, and, in effect, to make their own "private views of
political wisdom the measure of the Constitution." 9 He main-
tained that there was not a judicial remedy under the Consti-
tution for every political mischief and that federal courts con-
sistently have refused to exercise their equity powers in cases
involving purely political issues. Frankfurter categorized the
present case as one of a class of controversies which neither lend
themselves to judicial standards nor judicial remedies, but which
should be fought out in a non-judicial forum.
Frankfurter and Harlan both felt that the majority decision
had empowered the courts to devise permissible standards for
the proper composition of state legislatures, and in so doing, had
catapulted the lower courts into a "mathematical quagmire"
without "a legal calculus as a means of extrication." 40 The dis-
sent contended that the present case, having all the elements
that had made Guaranty Clause cases non-justiciable, was, "in
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 261.
38. Id. at 262.
39. Id. at 301, Frankfurter dissenting.
40. Id. at 268, Frankfurter dissenting.
[Vol. 16
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effect, a Guaranty Clause claim masquerading under a different
label."
4 1
Justice Harlan, dissenting separately, stated that there was
nothing in the Constitution preventing a state from rationally
choosing any electoral structure best suited to its interests, and
therefore that the complaint should have been dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Baker, with its unexplained and debatable substantive prin-
ciples and contemplation of remedies both novel and drastic,
had become the most momentous decision since the 1954 decision
in Brown v. The Board of Education.42 Yet, unlike Brown, it
rested on a more precarious base-a fragmented Court and an
abrupt reversal of position.43 But the most disturbing aspect of
Baker was that the majority purported to make a great pro-
nouncement without complete agreement even on what questions
were to be answered. 44 All six majority Justices, however, did
apparently agree (a) that apart from the "political questions"
problem, the court did have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) that Colgrove and its progeny of memorandum decisions had
not authoritatively settled the issue as a non-justiciable "political
question;" and (c) that, in fact, the apportionment of state
legislatures (as distinguished from congressional district ap-
portionment) is not a "political question." 45 Nevertheless the
Court's cryptic statement that they had "no cause at this stage
to doubt the district court will be able to fashion relief"46 left
one important question unanswered-just what would be con-
sidered "invidious discrimination" or would reflect "no policy,
but merely arbitrary and capricious action?"
GRAY v. SANDERS
Some of those questions left unanswered by Baker were re-
solved by the Court in an action attacking the Georgia county
41. Id. at 297, Frankfurter dissenting. Contra, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
228 (1962), Brennan for the majority. "We conclude then that the non-
justiciability of claims resting on the Guaranty Clause (article 4, section 4)
which arises from their embodiment of questions that were thought 'political'
can have no bearing upon the justiciability of the equal protection claim
presented in this case. "
42. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
43. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, Sup. CT. Rav. 253
(1962).
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 270.
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
1964]
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unit system. 47 The district court in Gray v. Sanders48 held that
the county unit system was not per se violative of the equal
protection clause, but that it must be so employed that no greater
disparity exists against any county than exists against any state
in the conduct of national elections. Analogizing from the
Federal Electoral College, the district court felt that such a
system applied rationally in a state among its counties could
hardly "be termed invidious."4 9 This questionable constitutional
concept applied by the court had a surprisingly double effect:
first, it based Georgia's electoral system on the rate of change
in the population of the great state of Alaska,5" and, second,
it belied Justice Brennan's confidence that the district courts
would have no trouble fashioning relief.
51
The Supreme Court, Justice Douglas writing for the majority,
reversed, declaring the county unit system, however applied, to
be violative of the fourteenth amendment.52 The Court found
that the inclusion of the electoral college with its "inherent
numerical inequality" allowed no implication of an analagous
system in statewide elections ;53 and that the fourteenth amend-
ment required that, within any one constituency, there can be
no other rule than "one person, one vote."5 4 Justice Stewart,
apparently disturbed by the possible implications of Justice
Douglas' "one person, one vote" pronouncement, wrote a separate
concurring opinion stressing that the decision did not involve
apportionment of state legislatures.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, challenged the Court's "doctri-
naire" 55 "one person, one vote" ideology as constitutionally un-
tenable, flying in the face of history, and opening the flood
gates to those theory problems which the court so "studiously
strove to avoid in Baker v. Oarr."56
47. Whoever received the majority of votes in a county received the full
vote of such county on a county unit basis.
48. 203 F. Supp. 158 (1962).
49. Id. at 169.
50. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, Sup. CT. RExv. 253, 318
(1962).
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
52. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id. at 381.
55. "It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for the Court, applying such
broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection under the
laws, to deny a state the power to assume a proper diffusion of political
initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concen-
trated masses .... The Constitution-a practical instrument of Government-
inakes no such demands on the states." [italics added]. MacDougall v. Green,
335 U.S. 281, 283 (1948).
56. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 388-389 (1963), Harlan dissenting.
[Vol. 16
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WESTBERRY v. SANDERS
Another Georgia skirmish brought up the exact question
answered seventeen years earlier in Colgrove, but this time to a
more receptive court. The majority of a three judge district
court had dismissed a claim that the congressional district ap-
portionment in Georgia was grossly discriminatory. Relying
on what little there was left to Colgrove,57 the lower court held
that it raised only "political questions" and therefore was not
justiciable.58 The Supreme Court, Justice Black for the ma-
jority,5 9 reversed. 60 Black concluded that article I, section 2 of
the Constitution-that "the House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second year by the People
of the Several States"--when construed in its historical context,
meant that as nearly as practicable one man's vote is worth as
much as another's. The Court cited Gray v. ,Sanders"1 as au-
thority for the "one person, one vote" rule.
Justice Clark dissented in part, arguing that article I, section
2 did not lay down the ipse dixit "one person, one vote" rule in
congressional elections, but that the claim should have been
examined according to the requirements of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Harlan again dissented, declaring the Court's decision
to be logically and historically unsound. He cited article I,
section 4-that the manner of holding elections for congressional
representatives was to be prescribed by the state legislatures
subject to review by Congress-and article I, section 5-that
each house shall be the judge of the election and qualifications
of its members. Harlan then concluded that, according to those
sections, only Congress and the state legislature could regulate
the apportionment of congressional districts-that all the Con-
stitution required is that Georgia's ten representatives are elected
by the people of Georgia. While conceding that perhaps most of
the framers of the Constitution believed that representation
should be based on population, he doubted that they surreptitious-
ly slipped "their belief into the Constitution in the phrase 'by
57. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 310 (1962), maintaining that the over-
riding reason why there was no "political question" involved was that it did not
relate to a co-ordinate branch of the federal government.
58. Westberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (1962).
59. See Black's dissent in Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946).
60. Westberry v. Sanders, 84 Sup. Ct. 526 (1964).
61. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
1961]
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the people' to be discovered one hundred and seventy-five years
later like a Shakespearian anagram.7
62
REYNOLDS v. SIMS
There was still a need for determining the basic standards
and drawing applicable guidelines to implement Baker v. Carr
as it applied to the apportionment of state legislatures. This was
not long in coming, for in June of 196d the Court ruled on
claims against the constitutionality of statutes apportioning the
legislatures in Alabama, 63 New York, 6 4 Colorado, 65 Mary-
land,60 Virginia, 67 and Delaware. 8 In those cases, the Court
held that "as a basic Constitutional standard, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bi-
cameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis."109 The Court rejected the federal analogy as "inapposite
and irrelevant to state legislative distributing schemes;1 °7O not
because "such a plan is irrational or involves something other
than a 'republican form of government;'" but because it in-
volves the "submergence of the equal population principle in
at least one house of a state legislature." 7'
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, conceded
that Gray and Westberry were not directly controlling, but held
that Westberry had clearly established that the fundamental
principle of representative government is one of equal repre-
sentation for equal numbers of people. Thus the question to be
determined was whether there was such discrimination against
certain of the state's voters to constitute "an impermissible im-
pairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote ;
'
72
and, if so, were there any constitutionally cognizable principles
that would justify a departure from that principle in appor-
tionment of state legislatures.
The court felt that the effect of giving the same number of
representatives to unequal numbers of constituents was, in effect,
62. Westberry v. Sanders, 84 Sup. Ct 526, 541 (1964).
63. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964).
64. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 Sup. Ct. 1418 (1964).
65. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 84 Sup. Ct. 1472
(1964).
66. Maryland Comm'n for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 84 Sup. Ct 1442
(1964).
67. Davis v. Mann, 84 Sup. Ct 1453 (1964).
68. Roman v. Sincock, 84 Sup. Ct. 1462 (1964).
69. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362, 1385 (1964).
70. Id. at 1387.
71. Id. at 1389.
72. Id. at 1381.
[Vol. 16
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weighing the votes of citizens differently merely because of
where they reside. This, they felt, was no more constitutionally
permissible than denial of their right to vote altogether. Thus,
when malapportionment is the result of legislative inaction de-
spite shifts in population, there then arises an affirmative duty
to reapportion;73 and when the malapportionment is a result
of the provisions of the state constitution, the supremacy clause
of the federal constitution controls.
In declaring the apportionment of the state of New York to
be unconstitutional,7 4 the Court found that the complicated ratio
system, requiring more populous counties to obtain an additional
full ratio to be given more than three senate seats, was no more
than a sophisticated form of discrimination. The court noted
that assemblymen representing thirty-four per cent of the
citizenry constituted a majority in the assembly and that those
representing forty-one per cent constituted a majority in the
senate. They were also impressed with the fact that there was
no adequate remedy to alleviate the malapportionment other
than through the state legislative process.7 5
On the other hand, the Court recognized that the initiative de-
vice in Colorado7 6 provided a practical political remedy, but
they nevertheless found "no significance in the fact that a non-
judicial, political remedy may be available."7 7 They discounted
the fact that an amendment apportioning the Colorado legis-
lature purely on a population basis had been defeated by more
than a two-to-one margin by noting that such a system would
have created multi-member districts. This, they thought, would
result in representatives in the more populous counties having
no identifiable constituency, a scheme not "in all probability,
wholly acceptable to the voters in the more populous counties."
78
And even lacking such undesirable features, the majority of
73. Id. at 1392-3. "Decennial reapportionment appears to be a rational ap-
proach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account
population shifts and growth . . . . But if reapportionment were accomplished
with less frequency, it would assuredly be constitutionally suspect."
74. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 Sup. Ct. 1418 (1964).
75. Ibid.
76. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 84 Sup. Ct. 1472,
1484 (1964).
77. Id. at 1486.
78. The system of apportioning South Carolina's House of Representatives
contains the same "undesirable" feature.
1964]
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the voters could not deny the constitutional rights of the
minority.79
Justice Stewart, with whom Justice Clark concurred,8 0 argued
that a rational plan drawn in the light of a state's own char-
acteristics and needs should be upheld. He felt that the cases
should be decided by the application of those accepted prin-
ciples under the fourteenth amendment that the Court recog-
nized in Bakeer v. Carr-whether the apportionment plan reflect
"Ko policy, but simply arbitrary or capricious action or inaction."
Justice Stewart argued that both the New York and Colorado
plans were designated in a rational way to insure the minority
some voice in legislative affairs while insuring that the will of
the majority would prevail.
Justice Stewart felt that the Court had converted a particular
political philosophy-that of equal representation for equal
numbers of people-into a Constitutional rule. And even if this
should be found to be the most desirable general rule of political
theory, the Constitution cannot be said to have frozen forever
this one political theory into our system of government. Justice
Stewart criticized the majority's decision as interpreting the
Constitution not "by what it says, but by their own notions of
wise political theory."8 1
Justice Harlan, dissenting, foresaw "a jarring picture of courts
threatening action in an area which they have no business enter-
ing" and rendering "political judgments which they are in-
competent to make.18 2 In Justice Harlan's opinion, "the Con-
stitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public wel-
fare"8 3 and the Court should have been guided by basic con-
cepts of judicial restraint in dealing with questions of such
delicate nature.
A possible indication of the Court's refusal to further restrict,
at least temporarily, the power of the states to control suffrage
may possibly be inferred from its memorandum affirmance of
79. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 84 Sup. Ct. 1472,
1486 (1964). "An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's
electorate. . ....
80. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 Sup. Ct. 1418, 1441 (1964), Clark dissenting.
"In my view, if one house is fairly apportioned by population (as is admitted
here) then the people should have some latitude in providing, on a rational
basis, for representation in the other house."
81. Id. at 1431, Stewart dissenting.
82. Reynolds v. Sims, Sup. Ct. 1364, 1412 (1964), Harlan dissenting.
83. Id. at 1414, Harlan dissenting.
[Vol. 16
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Boineau v. Thornton.8 4 Republican candidates for the state
house of representatives from Richland County, South Carolina,
brought an action to enjoin election officials from conducting
further elections under a South Carolina statute85 requiring a
voter to vote for the exact number of candidates to be elected to
a particular office or not have his vote counted.
The plaintiffs contended that a voter wishing to vote for a
Republican candidate-there being only two running in a race
for ten house seats-must either vote for eight Democrats or
resort to the complicated write-in process. They maintained
that this resulted in a dilution of Republican votes and was
thus violative of their rights under the fourteenth amendment."0
Judge Haynesworth, writing for a special three judge district
court, recognized that the statute "does impose some burden"
on the Republican nominees and that such dilution could be
minimized only at "the cost of some detriment to them."8 7 How-
ever, in dismissing the complaint, the court found a legitimate
purpose behind the statute, interpreted Reynolds v. Sims as pro-
hibiting only arbitrary dilution of voting power, and held that
whether "the legislature might have made it a wiser choice is
not a justiciable question."88 The Supreme Court affirmed.8 9
CONCLUSION
Baker recognized the more traditional concept of the four-
teenth amendment-that it prohibited any state action that was
arbitrary or capricious or reflected an invidious discrimination.
The application of this standard would have involved a factual
determination in each case of whether the apportionment scheme
represented a recognizable and bona fide state policy that was
not invidiously discriminatory against any segment of the popu-
lace. And, while the fact that an apportionment scheme was
based on the federal analogy or other rational considerations
would not have conclusively settled its validity, it would have
been persuasive argument.
84. 235 F. Supp. 175 (1964).
85. S. C. Code § 23-357 (1962).
86. One plaintiff also maintained that the statute was violative of her right
under the nineteenth amendment to cast her vote only for women candidates,
but the court dismissed this contention on the grounds that the statute was
"sexless."
87. Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 175, 178 (1964).
88. Id. at 182.
89. Boineau v. Thornton, 85 Sup. Ct. 151 (1964).
1964]
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But Reynolds delineates a more inflexible constitutional
standard. It prohibits any apportionment scheme that sub-
stantially deviates from the strict "one person, one vote" prin-
ciple. The application of this standard does have the beauty of
laying down more precise guidelines under the fourteenth amend-
ment. But it precludes the application of those principles which,
in the light of political reality, may result in a more stable state
government and may even be less arbitrary and capricious than -
strict population based apportionment.
A possible rationalization of Reynolds in the light of the more
traditional concepts of the fourteenth amendment runs some-
what as follows: First, it is unreasonable to allow a minority to
thwart the will of the majority. And, where a majority of legis-
lators represent somewhat less than fifty per cent of the citizenry,
it follows that the will of the majority is thwarted and there-
fore that the apportionment scheme is unreasonable. Second,
if the scheme is unreasonable, it runs afoul of the "Thou shalt
not be arbitrary and capricious" pronouncement in Baker, and,
hence, is unconstitutional. And third, given the above, the only
constitutionally permissible system of apportionment is one in
which both houses are apportioned substantially on a population
basis.
Justice Stewart had the unkindness to refer to this type of
logic as the "uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application
of sixth grade arithmetic." 0°
This type of rationalization rests on two basic suppositions.
First, it involves the assumption that the aggregate feeling of
the constituency will necessarily be reflected in the vote of their
representative; and, second, it assumes a homogeneity of voters
within the majority and minority districts. If these suppositions
are not contrary to fact with respect to any one particular issue,
they would certainly seem so when extended to the whole range
of issues in the legislative spectrum.
Indeed, the homogeneity of districts necessary to validate this
assumption could be promoted only by drawing district lines
so as to segregate the population by major interest groupings.
90. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 Sup. Ct. 1418, 1432-3 (1964). Apparently
Justice Stewart was more impressed with the arithmetical prowess displayed
in the briefs of counsel than with that of the majority opinion. In an oral
argument he credited them with the mastery of "eight grade arithmetic." 32
U.S.L. Week 3189 (1964).
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This is precisely the technique prohibited in Gomillion v. Light-
foot.9 '1
Applying similar logic and given a bare majority in each
legislative district,92 slightly more than twenty-five per cent of
the electorate will elect a majority of a legislature apportioned
strictly on a population basis. It would be absurd to contend
that this twenty-five per cent will control the legislature-and
equally absurd to maintain that they will thwart the will of the
remaining seventy-five per cent. Similarly, the assertion that the
consideration of historic, economic, or geographic factors in
legislative apportionment is per se "arbitrary" or "capricious"
has no more merit than the argument that apportionment purely
on a population basis does no more than to place a premium on
fertility.
There may be no perfect answer to the apportionment dilemma.
But one thing is painfully clear: it is much too complex a prob-
lem to be solved by any such pronouncement as "legislators
represent people, not trees or acres."93
J. KENDALL FEW
91. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
92. The court did not prohibit the use of legislative districts. To the con-
trary, Chief Justice Warren regarded the lack of legislative districts and
identifiable constituencies as one of the "most undesirable features" of one of
Colorado's apportionment schemes. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly
of Colorado, 84 Sup. Ct. 1472, 1483 (1964).
93. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362, 1382 (1964), Chief Justice Warren
writing for the majority.
1964]
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss4/4
